In recent years, the potential range of applications for sensor networks is expanding. Their use has been considered for safety critical areas such as: hospitals or power plants. The security comes more to the fore. This paper presents SecSens, an architecture that provides basic security components for wireless sensor networks. Since robust and strong security features require powerful nodes, SecSens uses a heterogeneous sensor network. In addition to a large number of simple (cheap) sensor nodes providing the actual sensor tasks, there are a few powerful nodes (cluster nodes) that implement the required security features. The basic component of SecSens offers authenticated broadcasts to allow recipients to authenticate the sender of a message. To protect the sensor network against routing attacks, SecSens includes a probabilistic multi-path routing protocol, which supports the key management and the authenticated broadcasts. SecSens also provides functions to detect forged sensor data by verifying data reports en-route. SecSens is successfully evaluated in a real test environment with two different kinds of sensor boards.
Introduction
Through the progression of miniaturization and improved wireless transmission techniques in recent years, a new and promising application area arose: wireless sensor networks. Embedded sensors offer intelligent devices and systems to perceive their environment. This allows them to react to events and physical conditions of the real world. For this purpose sensor networks consist of widely distributed sensor nodes forming together a network. Wireless connection between nodes enhances communication flexibility.
Generally, sensor nodes have limited energy and resources. This often leads to the fact, that existing concepts and techniques from other areas can not be transferred to sensor networks. In recent years, the research was mainly focused on issues related to energy efficiency and task distribution, such as data aggregation, or routing. Because of the steady increase in applications, safety requirements for sensor networks have received more attention. In particular, areas such as health or safety critical industrial facilities offer very good use for sensor networks, on the other hand, they also demand high safety standards to be observed.
A security architecture can never cover all types of threats simultaneously. Therefore, the application determines, which attack vectors are probable in current scenarios, and how attractive collected and processed data could be for a potential intruder. Not every sensor network pays an attack with enormous resources required to access its data, or to block it. In most cases, a combination of multiple protocols can confine a wide range of threats. Therefore a good compromise between cost and protection is often not a full defense against all attacks, instead it is preferable to maximize the obstacles for attackers. Many attackers resile if they have to increase extremely costs to break a security architecture.
This paper describes SecSens a security architecture for wireless sensor networks. SecSens focuses mainly on a robust and secure routing protocol and protection against data manipulation. The next section describes related security approaches for sensor networks. Section 3 introduces the SecSens architecture and its security features. SecSens is successfully evaluated in a real test environment with two different kinds of sensor boards. Section 3.5 describes the evaluation results. The paper ends with the conclusion.
techniques for sensor networks. The simplest method of key distribution is to pre-load a single network-wide key onto all nodes before deployment. Storage cost is minimal because each node has to store only one key. Unfortunately this approach provides sufficient security only if all nodes are protected against physical force. But this usually does not apply to low cost sensor nodes.
In [4] a security protocol for sensor networks called SPINS was presented for hierarchical sensor networks with one or more trustworthy base stations. SPINS consists of two parts: a secure network encryption protocol (SNEP) and authenticated broadcasts (µTESLA). The disadvantage of SNEP is that secure communication can be built only between a base station and nodes, and it is not possible to protect the communication in or between clusters. µTESLA uses delayed disclosure of symmetric keys for generating an asymmetry between sender and receiver. This approach requires weak time synchronization of sender and receiver in order to achieve time shifted key disclosure. Storage cost increases because each node has to buffer packets which it can only verify after receiving the key in the future timeslots. Also, this causes new possibilities for DoS-attacks. An attacker can force a buffer overflow by sending planned broadcasts. Furthermore µTESLA leads to scalability problems.
[6] suggests an adjusted key distribution for different security requirements. For this reason, four different kinds of keys are used. This approach provides more flexibility but contains a security risk during the initial key distribution phase.
Secure Routing: Compromised sensor nodes can influence a sensor network, especially by manipulating routing information. In order to minimize the impact, [2] suggests intrusion tolerant routing in wireless sensor networks called INSENS. INSENS prevents the network against most outsider attacks and even insider attacks remain locally. But the dependance on the base station suggests a single point of failure. Furthermore, the route discovery phase is extremely energy inefficient.
Another approach for secure routing called ARRIVE is presented in [3] . The routing algorithm tries to send packets over different paths based on probability.
Verification of Sensor Data: Each individual sensor node is potential target for attackers. Using compromised nodes, an attacker can directly influence the sensor network by infiltrating false reports of network sensor data. [7] describes an interleaved hop-by-hop authentication scheme for filtering of injected false data. Unfortunately, this approach uses single path routing to the base station providing several security risks. A statistical en-route filtering is presented in [5] that enhances the approach above by using probabilistic algorithms. But in both approaches, an attacker can create any report, once it has compromised at least t nodes. The sensor network in SecSens consists of clusters, each containing simple sensor nodes u i and one powerful sensor node v that acts as a cluster-head. Sensor nodes u i are connected directly to the cluster-head, because routing in clusters is not necessary. Sensor nodes can be a member of several clusters. Cluster-heads again build together an intercluster network, that is used to transfer messages to base stations. It is assumed that sensor nodes have a fixed position, once they are attached to a location. SecSens works with multiple base stations to avoid the risk of single-pointof-failure. The security architecture of SecSens combines several security approaches in order to provide high protection. Basically SecSens contains four components, which interact with each other: authenticated broadcasts, key management, routing, and en-route filtering.
Authenticated Broadcasts
Authenticated broadcasts ensure that the stated sender is identified as the true sender. Symmetric approaches use a shared key to generate a message authentication code (MAC). In case of only one receiver, the sender is clearly identified. But if there are multiple receivers with the same shared key, this approach for authentication is not applicable. Potentially each receiver could be the sender. To solve this problem, there must exist an asymmetry between sender and receiver.
SecSens provides two authenticated broadcasts: broadcasts from base stations, and broadcasts in clusters. It is assumed that base stations are trustworthy and can not be infiltrated. In order to generate an asymmetry, SecSens uses key chains. Each packet contains a key. To decrypt a previous packet, a node has to wait for the key of next packet.The base station generates a key chain K b 0 . . . K b n with sufficient number of keys using a publicly known one-way function F , so that for i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} is:
Each node knows that the first key in the chain is i, K b i
is the first nondisclosed key. Keys can be used only once. In order to broadcast a message M , the base station calculates the corresponding MAC using the next non-disclosed key K b i and sends it together with used key index to all its neighbors:
A receiving node u checks, if it has already received a MAC for the stated index, before storing the MAC and index i into the MAC buffer. Consequently node u accepts only one MAC per key index. If i is a new index and u is a cluster-head, it forwards the message to all its neighbors. In this way, it is efficiently distributed over the inter-cluster network to all sensor nodes. After maximum time T all sensor nodes know the MAC together with its key index. Sensor nodes can not manipulate the MAC, because the base station has not yet disclosed K b i at this time. Time T p describes a dynamically adaptable system parameter. The base station can set T p depending on the network size, whereas T < T p . After expiration of T p , the base station sends the actual message M besides the disclosed key data i, K b i to all neighbors:
Sensor node u can now verify K The concept of authenticated broadcasts for base stations has a disadvantage, if it is used for local authenticated broadcasts between clusters, because of the delayed disclosure of keys. However, all receivers of a message in a cluster can be reached after a single hop. This fact can be used to simplify the concept, in order to avoid time delays. The cluster-head generates a key chain K 
Key Management
Sensor nodes basically distrust each other. To build trust between two or more nodes, a shared secret in the form of keys is needed. However, neighborhood and relations between sensor nodes are not known before. Therefore, nodes must build trust during life-time, more strictly in the initial phase. For security reasons, a sensor node should join a network only once. In this critical phase, it can establish shared keys with its neighbors. Since this procedure is performed only once, the node is binding itself to the location. Furthermore, sensor nodes can communicate at several levels, that is cluster-or network-wide. Consequently, SecSens uses several kinds of keys to fulfill different security requirements.
Activation: In the initial phase, a sensor node needs an initial key K I . This key is stored only on a specific activation node, which does not take part for usual networking tasks. The basic idea is that sensor nodes can not install themselves independently. Instead a trustworthy employee, who owns the activation node, establishes sensors. In order to add a set of sensor nodes, the base station stores a randomly generated master key K A , timer T A , initial key K I , and current group key K g onto the activation node A. Using master key K A , the base station can generate for each sensor node u a personal activation key K a u based on the node ID.
K
All key material and other security critical data are stored only in RAM of A. T A determines period of validity for the master key. After expiration of this time, the activation node deletes K A and all critical data. Each sensor node u has a unique ID and a personal activation key K a u . In order to activate sensor node u, the activation node A has to be in the communication range. For security reasons, the radio power of A is kept low, to ensure physical proximity. After turning on for the first time, sensor node u broadcasts periodically its plain ID and the ID encrypted with the personal key with the same low radio power. Activation node A can easily verify the ID, because it knows the master key K A . As the next step, A encrypts with personal key of u the initial key K I , group key K g , and data X that was given by base station. Finally, A sends encrypted message to sensor node u:
After receiving all key material, sensor node u is activated and it deletes the personal activation key.
Group keys: The group key K g is used by the base station to secure network-wide communication. An attacker, who compromises a node, can also access the group key. In order to update K g , the base station broadcasts first a list of known compromised nodes {x 1 , ..., x m } to all sensor nodes. Additionally, it sends a verification key F K g (0), whereas K g is a new randomly generated group key, and F a publicly known one-way function. F K g (0) is used later to verify the new group key K g .
BS → *
The base station uses an authenticated broadcast with key K b i and index i that is not disclosed yet. After receiving key K b i and successfully verifying the above message (see section 3.1), sensor nodes delete all pair-wise shared keys or cluster-keys with compromised node x i . Cluster-heads additionally update their cluster-keys and inform other noncompromised cluster-heads about new cluster-key. Afterwards, all sensor nodes store verification key F K g (0). As a second step, the base station publishes new group key K g . Therefore, it encrypts the group key using its cluster-key K c BS and transfers the message to all direct neighbors. The neighbors can verify K g using verification key F K g (0) and store afterwards the new group key.
If receiver u is a cluster-head, it forwards a new group key K g encrypted by its own cluster key K c u . Consequently, the new group key K g is forwarded over the intercluster network to all sensor nodes. Since cluster-heads have updated their cluster keys before, the compromised nodes do not receive the new group key. This procedure is periodically repeated by base stations to prevent the network against attacks. If there are no new known compromised nodes, the transferred list is empty.
Pair-wise shared keys: For secure communication between sensor nodes, pair-wise shared keys are used. A new cluster-head exchanges a pair-wise key with all neighbors. Simple sensor nodes communicate only over cluster-head, therefore, they need only a shared key with their clusterhead. Using the initial key K I each node u generates a personal master key K p u based on its ID. In order to establish a pair-wise shared key with its neighbor v, node u needs the ID of v. For this reason u broadcasts a HELLO-message containing its ID. If v decides to establish secure connection with new node u, it answers with an acknowledgment containing its own ID.
The additional MAC authenticates the acknowledgement of v, because u can calculate master key K p v of v using initial key K I . Node u does not need to authenticate itself, because the succeeding message exchange verifies the identity of u. The pair-wise shared key K p uv can be calculated by both nodes without new message exchange:
After expiration of time T I the nodes delete initial key K I and all personal master keys of their neighbors received during initialization. Only one personal master key is stored for future pair-wise keys with new sensor nodes. The annulment of compromised pair-wise keys is efficiently realized by deletion of corresponding keys.
Cluster keys: Sensor nodes transfer information to all other cluster members using the cluster key without encrypting the message for each receiver separately. This approach allows in-network-processing and passive participation of sensor nodes within a cluster. Cluster-head u generates randomly cluster key K c u , if u joins a network or if u updates cluster key because of compromised nodes. Each cluster member v 1 , . . . , v m receives new cluster key K c u , whereas u encrypts cluster key using pair-wise shared keys K p uvi for i ∈ {1, . . . , m}:
Only sensor node v i can decrypt cluster key and store it. If an additional sensor node v joins the network, it establishes a new pair-wise shared key with cluster-head. In this case it also gets the current cluster key. If a cluster member is compromised, cluster-head annuls cluster key K c u and distributes new key K c u as described above, without sending it to the compromised nodes.
Routing
To prevent attacks on routing level or restrict them locally, SecSens provides a secure routing protocol. Simple sensors in SecSens do not need a routing capability, because they exclusively communicate with the cluster-head. Therefore, routing is used only within the inter-cluster network built by cluster-heads. The routing algorithm has two phases: initialization and the actual routing. In the initialization phase each node gets a level using breadth first search that determines the distance to base station in hops. Since base station has level 0, its direct neighbors have level 1. The base station uses an authenticated broadcast including its ID BS u , a non-disclosed key K b i , and key index i to authenticate an initialization.
BS → * :
Cluster-heads can identify from authenticated messages, which base station wants to update routing information. After reception of initialization, cluster-heads have time T to modify their routing tables. After expiration of T , further changes are not allowed. Cluster-heads set their level on L = ∞ after reception of the message (see Equation 16 ). The breadth first search can now begin. Starting from the base station, the level values are locally broadcasted by cluster-heads. To prevent outsider-attacks each cluster-head u uses key K b i , that will be published later, and its cluster key K c u to generate an encrypted message containing ID and level value L u :
It also stores level of u. After level update, v forwards its level value to its neighbors in the same way. Each base station triggers its own initialization without disturbing ongoing updates of others. The cluster-heads manage a routing table for each base station.
SecSens uses probabilistic multi-path routing based on the level values to forward messages from cluster-heads on the way to the corresponding base station. Cluster-heads build up a trust matrix, where each transmission to its neighbors is recorded. Based on this trust information and current level, cluster-heads calculate a probability value and write it into the packet header. This value is used to decide in which direction the packet has to be send. Each clusterhead modifies the probability value and sends the message over the most trustworthy route. Since this could lead to the problem that a packet stays at the same level while making a round-trip, the weight of upper level increases with each hop. This ensures that packet transfer goes in the direction of the base station.
Furthermore, SecSens provides passive participation, i.e. sensor nodes listen to packet transmissions of their neighbors. If cluster-head u detects a packet addressed to its neighbor v, and recognizes that v is not forwarding the message, u takes responsibility with a certain (low) probability. Also, if u assumes that v forwards the message to a nonexistent node, u takes care of transferring.
En-route Filtering
Attacks like report fabrication or false data injection threaten the network by manipulating and infiltrating sensor data. SecSens prevents such threats using en-route filtering extending approach of [5] . Cluster-heads generate data reports containing sensor information of cluster members for sending them to base stations. These reports are verified during transfer through the inter-cluster network. En-route filtering consists of three phases: key generation, report generation, and verification.
Key generation: SecSens provides a global pool containing N en-route keys K are subdivided in n partitions with each m keys. Each sensor node generates all en-route keys in the initial phase using one-way function F and chooses randomly a partition j where it finally draws k < m keys from set j:
Only base stations can definitely detect all fault reports, because they possess all keys of the key pool. Based on the same partition j, each node calculates in a similar way location key K l C,j for all its clusters that it senses as a member. Sensor nodes bind themselves locally to actual cluster by the location key. After the initial phase nodes delete all remaining unused keys.
Report generation: If a cluster-head wants to generate a report, it collects sensor data from all its cluster members. Sensor nodes belonging to the same cluster report events (sensor data) collectively by generating MACs based on their en-route keys, whereas keys must be chosen from different partitions. These multiple MACs collectively act as the proof that a report is legitimate. Finally, the clusterhead forwards the report to the base station over the intercluster network.
Verification of reports: A cluster-head receiving a report checks, if it has one of the keys, that were used to generate the MACs in the report. With a certain probability, it will be able to verify the correctness of MACs. A report with an insufficient number of MACs will not be forwarded. A compromised node has keys from one partition and can generate MACs of one category only. Since keys and indices of distinct partitions must be present in a legitimate report, the compromised node has to forge the other key indices and corresponding MACs. This can be easily detected by cluster-heads possessing these keys. If a cluster-head has none of the keys and number of MACs is correct, it forwards report to the next cluster-head. Even if a forged report receives a base station, it can be detected, because base stations know all the used keys.
Evaluation
SecSens was evaluated on an environment with different kinds of sensor nodes: ESB 430/1 and MSB-430 of Freie University Berlin. Both sensor boards have the TI MSP430 microcontroller. ESB 430/1 contains 60 KB flash memory and 2 KB RAM, whereas MSB-430 has 55 KB flash memory and 5 KB RAM. Because of the larger RAM, MSB-430 was used as cluster-head. We used four cluster-heads managing each five sensor nodes that were all ESB boards, making 20 nodes alltogether. Two PCs act as base stations. We could successfully perform all stages of SecSens which were described before.
In order to use memory effectively, SecSens stores frequently changing data in RAM and relatively static data in EEPROM. The most memory space is used for key management which takes 43% of RAM.
In the initial phase, energy consumption is comparatively high. For establishing the network and distribution of keys, cluster-heads consume in average 2.6W s energy, whereas sensor nodes need only 0.2W s (see Table 1 ). 
. Energy consumption with passive participation
Energy consumption for sending reports depends on the distance between cluster-head and the base station. We established in a second test a network with up to 20 clusterheads placed in a line side by side. The last cluster-head received level 20, which means that it needs 20 hops to reach the base station. We measured the energy consumption for sending reports from different levels. The multi-path routing ensures a robust transmission, but sending duplicated packets from several routes (fanout) increases the energy consumption. Figure 1 shows consumed energy for reports using no fanout (reference) or multiple fanouts.
As mentioned above, nodes can listen to packet transmission of neighbors and can take the responsibility for forwarding with a certain probability in case of detected failures. Figure 2 describes 
Conclusion
This paper presented SecSens, a security architecture for wireless sensor networks. SecSens combines several security approaches in order to provide high protection. SecSens contains four components, which interact with each other: authenticated broadcasts, key management, routing, and enroute filtering. Feasibility of SecSens was demonstrated in a sensor network environment with two different kinds of sensor nodes.
